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Abstract: This study empirically evaluates the impact of the war in eastern Ukraine on the polit-
ical attitudes and sentiments towards Ukraine and Russia among the population living close to the
war zone on the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government. Exploiting unique survey data
that were collected in early 2013 (13 months before the outbreak of the conflict) and early 2015 (11
months after the outbreak), we employ two strategies to infer how the war has affected two differ-
ent groups defined by distance to the war zone. First, we apply a before-after analysis to examine
intra-group changes in attitudes over time. Second, we use a difference-in-differences approach to
investigate inter-group divergence over time. Under particular assumptions, the latter approach
yields a lower absolute bound for the effect. We control for a range of observed characteristics
and consider both parametric and semiparametric estimation based on inverse probability weight-
ing. Our results suggest that one year of conflict negatively affected attitudes towards Russia,
while mostly no statistically significant intra- or inter-group differences were found for sentiments
towards Ukraine.
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1 Introduction
This study aims at evaluating the impact of the conflict in eastern Ukraine on the political orien-
tation of the population in the war-affected area. The pro-Russian unrest in the east of Ukraine,
which started in April 2014 shortly after Russia had annexed Crimea in March 2014, escalated to
a violent war in spring 2014. Given its geopolitical context and its implications for stability and
security in Europe, this military conflict echoed far beyond in multilateral political and economic
relations.1 Exploiting unique survey data from a repeated cross section, we investigate how pref-
erences about the political status of Ukraine and sentiments towards Ukraine and Russia evolved
among individuals living close to the war zone on the Ukrainian-controlled territory between early
2013, i.e. 13 months before the war, and 2015, i.e. 11 months after the war outbreak. Our analysis
therefore focuses on the eastern part of Ukraine as far as controlled by government forces, namely
Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts (administrative units), which
before the war used to share strong cultural and socioeconomic ties. Specifically, these regions
represent the most extensively Russian speaking part of Ukraine that had the longest common
history with Russia (see Barrington and Herron, 2004).
To infer on the causal effect of the conflict, our empirical strategy relies on the assumption
that the intensity of the war decreases in the geographic distance to the war zone. We base our
analysis on the minimum road distance by car to the cities of Donetsk or Luhansk - the centers
of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, which are both situated close to
the front line - as a measure for distance to the war zone. This allows splitting the sample into
two treatment groups: all cities located up to 100 km to either Donetsk or Luhansk form the
high intensity group, while more distant cities belong to the low intensity group. We employ two
econometric approaches. First, we apply a before-after analysis to examine intra-group changes
in attitudes over time. This only yields unbiased effect estimates if time trends in attitudes
can be ruled out, at least conditional on observed characteristics. Second, our main strategy is
based on a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to investigate inter-group divergence over time.
Under particular assumptions (see Fricke, 2015), namely when the impact in the high intensity
1In response to Russia’s supposed role in the conflict in Ukraine, the European Union (EU) and other countries
(e.g. the United States, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Japan, and Australia) introduced a range of diplomatic and
economic sanctions against a list of individuals and companies from Russia and Ukraine. Resorting to countermea-
sures, Russia banned food imports from a number of countries. Christen et al. (2015) assess the potential economic
consequences of export sanctions between the EU plus Switzerland and Russia.
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group weakly dominates that in the low intensity group in absolute terms, a lower bound for the
absolute effect of the war on political attitudes is obtained. We control for a range of observed
socioeconomic characteristics and consider both parametric and semiparametric estimation based
on inverse probability weighting by the propensity score to belong to the high intensity group.
Our findings suggest that the political attitudes towards Russia have deteriorated as a conse-
quence of the war. In either group, the before-after differences in (i) supporting a political union
with Russia and (ii) stating that Ukraine and Russia should be one state are substantially negative
and statistically significant at the 5% level in all but one of our main specifications. Furthermore,
for (ii), the DiD approach yields a sizable negative effect which is significant at the 10% level in the
majority of specifications. Similarly, a negative DiD estimate is found for the judgment that the
Ukrainian and Russian cultures are the same, which is mainly driven by before-after differences in
the high intensity group. In contrast, both the before-after and DiD estimates on attitudes and
sentiments towards Ukraine and Ukrainians (i.e. sympathy for Ukraine and self-association with
other Ukrainians) were insignificant in most cases. The estimated effects are relatively robust to
the choice of control variables and the definition of the treatment groups in terms of distance to
the war zone.
Among the growing literature investigating the political impacts of exposure to war and vi-
olence, ethnic conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa have attracted particular attention. For instance,
the results in Bellows and Miguel (2009), Blattman (2009), and Voors et al. (2012) suggest that
individuals who personally experienced wartime violence and trauma during civil wars in Africa
(Sierra Leone, Uganda, Burundi, respectively) increase their political and civic engagements and
community leadership. Also Bateson (2012), who considers a cross section of 70 countries in Latin
America, Africa, North America, Europe and Asia, finds that individuals who report that they
or their family members have been recent victims of crimes are more politically active than their
non-victimized peers. Applying a regression discontinuity-type design to the timing and location
of (Afrobarometer) survey interviews in Zimbabwe, Garcia-Ponce and Pasquale (2015) documents
that individuals indirectly exposed to political repression self-report higher levels of trust into the
state and its institutions. Erikson and Stoker (2011) examine how Vietnam draft lottery numbers
randomly assigned according to birth dates influenced the political attitudes of males. Men with
low lottery numbers are found to be more antiwar and liberal in their voting behavior than those
with high lottery numbers protected from the draft. As one potential mechanism of war, DellaVi-
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gna et al. (2014) investigate how exposure to nationalistic cross-border Serbian public radio affects
the voting behavior and anti-Serbian sentiment in the post-conflict region of Croatia at the border
with Serbia. Employing a DiD and synthetic control approach, ? consider the electoral effects of
the terrorist attacks in Madrid and conclude that they shifted the advantage from the conservative
to the socialist party in the 2004 congressional election.
Closer related to our research question, Rohner et al. (2013) employ an instrumental variable
method to study the civil conflict in Uganda and find that intense violence strengthens within-
ethnic group ties, but significantly weakens trust towards other Ugandans. Most relevant for our
work is the study by Coupe´ and Obrizan (2016), which investigates the effects of violence on
political outcomes in two cities of the Donetsk region which were temporarily controlled by the
pro-Russian militants. Relying on cross sectional survey data, their results suggest that physical
damage is negatively associated with the turnout probability and the likelihood to know local
political representatives. Property damage, on the other hand, increases self-reported votes for
pro-Western parties and reduces support for Donbass remaining a part of Ukraine or for any
compromise with the pro-Russian forces.2
In contrast to the majority of studies that focus on post-violence outcomes, our analysis, like
the one by Coupe´ and Obrizan (2016), concerns a point in time when the war was still ongoing.
However, our study differs from that of Coupe´ and Obrizan (2016) in three dimensions. First,
the outcome variables considered mostly differ, with the present work having a stronger focus on
political attitudes towards Ukraine and Russia and Coupe´ and Obrizan (2016) predominantly (but
not exclusively) considering election-related questions. Second, Coupe´ and Obrizan (2016) rely on
observations within a war affected area, while we exploit variation across areas that were and were
not exposed to war. Third, while Coupe´ and Obrizan (2016) use a single cross section, our repeated
cross section allows observing the outcome variables already prior to the conflict and applying a
DiD approach in order to tackle confounding related to time-constant unobservables. In addition to
an OLS-based implementation, we base DiD estimation on a semiparametric weighting approach,
which is more flexible in terms of functional form assumptions than the estimators conventionally
used in the empirical literature.
Our findings confirm the general result from previous studies that exposure to war and violence
2A further empirical study concerned with the conflict in eastern Ukraine is Zhukov (2016), who, however, does
not investigate any effects, but rather the triggers of rebel activity. His results suggest that pre-conflict economic
ties with Russia are a better predictor for rebel activity than the ethnolinguistic composition of municipalities.
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has consequences with respect to political attitudes, albeit the context differs from much of the
literature. Specifically, our estimates suggest that the attitude towards Russia has deteriorated as
a consequence of the war, which is probably driven by Russia’s perceived role as major proponent
of the separatists’ objectives through its politics, media, and likely military support.3 This appears
interesting from a political perspective, because it suggests that the conflict did not make eastern
Ukrainians more sympathetic towards Russia, at least in the government-controlled areas, as some
might have speculated in the light of the close language and cultural ties with Russia. Quite
contrarily, Russia appears to have lost political capital in the most Russian speaking part of
Ukraine, while no negative effects on attitudes and sentiments towards Ukraine were found. Our
results are somewhat in line with the finding of Coupe´ and Obrizan (2016) that the experience
of property damage decreases the support for the view that the Ukrainian government should
compromise with Russia.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the conflict background.
Section 3 discusses the data and the definition of the treatment groups and provides a range
of descriptive statistics on outcomes and control variables. Section 4 outlines our econometric
approaches based on parametric and semiparametric before-after and DiD estimation and discusses
identification issues, such as migration patterns in the region. Section 5 presents the estimated
results along with a range of robustness checks. Section 6 provides two placebo tests for our DiD
approach. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background and development of the conflict in Donbass
From the night of 21 November 2013 on the “Euromaidan” movement - a wave of public
demonstrations - captured major cities of Ukraine starting on Independence Square in Kyiv.
It was triggered by the decision of the Ukrainian government to temporally suspend the
preparation to signing the Association Agreement with the EU4 due to concerns about the
industrial production and relations between Ukraine and members of the Commonwealth of
3At the annual press conference on 17 December 2015, Vladimir Putin admitted that there were military intelli-
gence officers operating in the east of Ukraine. The video is available at: www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/
dec/17/vladimir-putins-annual-press-conference-live, retrieved 23 April 2016.
4The Guide to the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement is available at: eeas.europa.eu/images/top_stories/
140912_eu-ukraine-associatin-agreement-quick_guide.pdf, retrieved 23 April 2016.
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Independent States (CIS).5 The initial demand for closer European integration expanded to
requests for political change in the country after the failure of the Ukrainian side to sign the
Association Agreement at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius on 28-29 November 2013.6
The situation culminated into the “Revolution of Dignity” in February 2014 as a result of
violent fights with fatalities involving protesters, police and unknown shooters. The Ukrainian
parliament voted to oust the acting president who finally fled and left the country. The new
presidential elections were scheduled for 25 May 2014. In the meantime, the country was run by
a temporary government.
On 16 March 2014, the so-called referendum on the status of Crimea7 took place, after the
peninsula had previously been penetrated by armed forces without insignia most likely belonging
to the Russian army.8 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) refused
to send observers to the Crimean “referendum” because it was considered to violate the Ukrainian
constitution as well as international law.9 As a result of the referendum’s outcome, Russia officially
annexed the peninsular on 18 March 2014.
In Donbass, the pro-Russian unrest escalated to the status of war in early April 2014 following
a sequence of events in Ukraine.10 On 7 April 2014, pro-Russian separatists occupied buildings of
the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk and self-declared the “Donetsk People’s
Republic” followed by the “Luhansk People’s Republic” on 27 April 2014.11 In response to the
unrest in Donbass, the Ukrainian government launched an “anti-terrorist operation” against the
pro-Russian separatists in mid-April. To de-escalate the conflict in Donbass, the representatives of
Ukraine, Russia, the US and the EU agreed in Geneva upon dissolving and disarming non-official
5Reported by Interfax-Ukraine at: en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/176144.html, retrieved 23 April 2016.
6The Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit is available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/139765.pdf, retrieved 23 April 2016.
7Two options were offered to choose from and either differed from the status quo: whether to join Rus-
sia as a federal subject or to restore the Crimean constitution of 1992 which provided greater power to the
Crimean government. Reported by The New York Times at: www.nytimes.com/2014/03/15/world/europe/
crimea-vote-does-not-offer-choice-of-status-quo.html?_r=0, retrieved 23 April 2016.
8See for instance the report of “Suomen Sotilas” (Soldier of Finland): https:
//web.archive.org/web/20150330124704/http://www.suomensotilas.fi/en/artikkelit/
crimea-invaded-high-readiness-forces-russian-federation, retrieved 23 April 2016.
9The OSCE press release is available at: www.osce.org/cio/116313, retrieved 23 April 2016.
10Reported by BBC: www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275, retrieved 23 April 2016.
11Reported by the Human Rights Watch at: www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/11/
eastern-ukraine-questions-and-answers-about-laws-war, retrieved 23 April 2016.
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military formations in the region. However, the pro-Russian rebels insisted on holding referen-
dums and continued occupying buildings of the Ukrainian administration.12 On 11 May 2014, the
so-called referendums took place on the separatist-held territories to legitimize the self-declared
Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.13 Avoiding formal diplomatic recognition, Russia ex-
pressed its respect for the outcomes of the “referendums” and its hope for the “civilized imple-
mentation” thereof.14 On 24 May 2014, the self-proclaimed republics declared to form a federal
union named “Novorosiya”.15 Since the beginning of the war in Donbass, several waves of army
mobilization followed across the territories governed by the Ukrainian authorities. Furthermore,
the Russian state-controlled media were banned in the government-held part of Ukraine. On 17
July 2014, the world saw the missile-induced crash of the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 from Amster-
dam to Kuala Lumpur in eastern Ukraine. On 27 January 2015, the Ukrainian parliament passed
a resolution declaring Russia an aggressor state16 supporting terrorism and blocking activities of
the United Nations (UN) Security Council.17
In response to the development of and the supposed role of Russia in the conflict in Donbass,
the European Union (EU) and other countries (e.g. the US, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Japan,
and Australia) introduced or expanded from July 2014 on a range of diplomatic and economic
sanctions against a list of individuals and companies from Russia and Ukraine. Following intense
consultations of the trilateral contact group (Ukraine, Russia, Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe), the Minsk II protocol of 12 February 201518 was agreed upon after the Minsk
protocol of 5 September 201419 had failed to resolve the conflict in Donbass. The document outlined
12Reported by The Guardian at:
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/18/ukraine-separatists-occupation-geneva-agreement, retrieved 23
April 2016.
13Two choices were offered: agree or disagree on the independence status of the Donetsk and
Luhansk People’s Republics. Reported by The Guardian at: www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/10/
donetsk-referendum-ukraine-civil-war, retrieved 23 April 2016.
14Reported by Reuters at: www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-kremlin-idUSBREA4B04O20140512,
retrieved 23 April 2016.
15Reported by Russia Today at: www.rt.com/news/161304-donetsk-lugansk-unite-state/, retrieved 23 April
2016.
16Reported by Unian at: www.unian.info/politics/1036816-ukrainian-parliament-declares-russia-aggressor-state.
html, retrieved 23 April 2016.
17In 2014-2015, Russia vetoed twice draft resolutions of the UN Security Council on the situation in Ukraine.
Reported at: research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick, retrieved 23 April 2016.
18The document is available in Russian only at: www.osce.org/cio/140156, retrieved 23 April 2016.
19The document is available in Russian only at: www.osce.org/home/123257, retrieved 23 April 2016.
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a package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements to successfully reach a
lasting ceasefire. On 17 March 2015, the Ukrainian parliament approved a law on the “special
status” of certain parts of Donbass which raised broad discussions about its compliance with
Minsk II.20 After months of violations, Ukraine and the separatists ultimately decided to respect
the ceasefire from 1 September 2015 on. This entailed a considerable reduction in fighting21 and
no further territorial changes occurred. In the beginning of 2016, the war was therefore considered
by some to be a “frozen conflict”,22 yet clashes and casualties continued and lasting peace was still
out of reach.
3 Data and treatment definition
Our data come from a representative population survey in Ukraine conducted in February-March
2013 by the sociological institute “Rating” and repeated in March-April 2015 by the company
“Socioinform” on behalf of an interdisciplinary research project on regionalism in Ukraine. The
sample consists of a repeated cross section with 6000 individual observations per survey year. The
first wave includes all 24 oblasts (administrative units) plus the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
while the second wave only covers the territory controlled by the Ukrainian authorities at that
time. For this reason, Crimea, which had been annexed by Russia on 18 March 2014, is excluded,
as well as those parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts controlled by the pro-Russian separatists.
The sampling was based on stratification by gender, age and municipality type. The face-to-face
interviews were conducted either in Ukrainian or Russian, as desired by the respondent. Therefore,
no misunderstandings related to language issues are to be expected. Interviewers were instructed
to emphasize that the survey was carried out for research purposes only and that analyses would
be performed anonymously on the aggregate level, in order to minimize mistrust and reluctance
to answer politically sensitive questions. Indeed, response rates are rather high as outlined further
below.
This study focuses on questions about preferences for the political future of Ukraine, attitudes
about Ukrainian-Russian relations and sentiments towards Ukraine and Ukrainians. Respondents
20Reported by Reuters at: www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-status-idUSKBN0MD1ZK20150317, re-
trieved 23 April 2016.
21See for instance the UN report at: http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12154.doc.htm, retrieved 23 April
2016.
22Reported by BBC at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35990401, retrieved 23 April 2016.
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were asked, inter alia, to state their most preferred option out of five mutually exclusive scenarios:
Ukraine remains an independent and neutral state, Ukraine enters a large union including Russia,
Ukraine splits into separate states, Ukraine joins the EU, Ukraine joins a large union including
Central and Eastern European (CEE) states. In our analysis each option is a binary variable which
is coded as one if it is picked as preference and zero otherwise. Note that in the results presented
in Section 5, the last two options are excluded, as they are not at the center of this paper’s focus
on attitudes towards Ukraine and Russia. Furthermore, interviewees were asked to which extent
they agree or disagree with the statements that the Ukrainian and Russian cultures are exactly
the same, that Ukraine and Russia should form one state, that they love Ukraine and whether
they speak about Ukrainians as “we” and not as “they”. The former two questions are evaluated
on a point scale from 1 (“fully disagree”) to 7 (“fully agree”) and the latter two are assessed on a
scale from 1 (“definitely no”) to 5 (“definitely yes”).
Besides the outcomes of interest, the data also include a range of socioeconomic information
about the respondents, namely gender, age, marital status, education, occupation, native
language, religion, residence and self-assessed material conditions. To evaluate how the war in
eastern Ukraine affected political attitudes and sentiments of the local population, we focus our
analysis on the territories controlled by Ukraine sufficiently close to the war zone when the second
survey wave took place. Besides the government-controlled parts of the war-affected Donetsk
and Luhansk oblasts, the so-called Donbass region, these areas include three further oblasts:
Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia (hereafter referred to as the “remainder of the east”).
Taken together, these five oblasts form the east of Ukraine, which is characterized by a high
concentration of native Russian speakers and heavy industry as well as the geographic proximity
and historic connections to Russia. Figure 1 illustrates the front line in Donbass end of March to
show which parts of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions where under government control at the
time of the second survey.
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Figure 1: Front line in Donbass as of 31 March 2015
Source: Information Analysis Center of the National Security and Defense
Council of Ukraine: www.mediarnbo.org.
Given that the interviewers could reach only areas controlled by the Ukrainian authorities
in early 2015 and that the sociological agencies conducting the surveys were different in the two
periods, the included cities and villages in eastern Ukraine only partially coincide across the survey
waves. To maximize the comparability of observations in 2013 and 2015, our analysis only includes
cities that were observed in both periods.23 The evaluation sample consists of 920 observations in
2013 and 1153 observations in 2015 (see Table A1 in Appendix A) and includes 8 municipalities
with 380 observations over both periods in Donbass and 19 municipalities with 1693 observations
in the remainder of the east.
To assess whether the evaluation sample is representative for the east of Ukraine prior to
the war, we test for mean differences in both control and outcome variables across included and
excluded observations, separately for Donbass and the remainder of the east in the first wave. The
corresponding descriptive statistics and t-tests are presented in Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix
23The data do not contain any villages in Donbass that appear in both waves. To ensure comparability in
municipality size across Donbass and the rest of the east, we therefore also drop villages in the remainder of the east
from our evaluation sample.
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A. We observe some significant differences in socioeconomic characteristics across groups. The
average material conditions and the proportion of marriages or partnership were significantly higher
in the excluded observations of Donbass than in the included ones. Compared to the excluded
observations in the remainder of the east, the included ones lived on average in significantly
larger cities due to dropping villages and in better material conditions, were more likely to have a
university degree and to speak Russian as a native language, and more frequently follow the Kyiv
Orthodox Church. Concerning the outcome variables, we do not find any significant differences
across the included and excluded observations in Donbass. In the remainder of the east, the
included observations were on average less pro-Ukrainian and more likely favored the scenario of a
split of Ukraine than excluded ones. We therefore bear in mind that in terms of pre-war covariates
and outcome variables, our evaluation sample appears to be much more representative for Donbass
than for the remainder of the east. However, the latter seems to be only a minor caveat in the
context of our quantitative analysis, which focusses on the effect in the war-affected Donbass.
Our DiD approach outlined in Section 4 is based on the assumption that the distance to the
war zone determines the intensity of conflict. We expect that the closer individuals live to the
conflict area, the higher the “treatment” (i.e. war) intensity should be. Throughout the military
conflict in Donbass, the front line has been moving into one or another direction,24 but the regional
capitals Donetsk and Luhansk have permanently been at or close to the front line. Therefore, we
take the minimum road distance (by car) to Donetsk or Luhansk - also the political centers of
the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics - as a measure for distance to the
war zone. Figure A1 in Appendix A displays a frequency distribution of the minimum distance.
This allows us to define two treatment groups: all cities located within 100 km to either Donetsk
or Luhansk form the high treatment group while more distant cities belong to the low treatment
group. The former includes five cities in Donbass and the latter covers three Donbass cities (see
Table A4 in Appendix A) plus the remainder of the east.
24The maps of the front line for different dates of the conflict are provided by the Information Analysis Center of
the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine at: www.mediarnbo.org.
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Table 1: Mean covariate values by minimum distance to Donetsk or Lugansk
2013 2015
<100 km ≥100 km Difference p-value <100 km ≥100 km Difference p-value
City size: <50000 citizens (binary) 0.133 0.168 -0.035 0.824 0.134 0.115 0.019 0.895
(0.149) (0.073) (0.155) (0.147) (0.055) (0.145)
Female (binary) 0.571 0.555 0.017 0.139 0.573 0.563 0.010 0.785
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.039) (0.009) (0.037)
Age 45.276 45.182 0.095 0.897 46.671 46.055 0.616 0.562
(0.694) (0.354) (0.725) (1.117) (0.251) (1.049)
Secondary specialized education (binary) 0.410 0.382 0.028 0.704 0.427 0.355 0.072 0.076
(0.077) (0.018) (0.073) (0.036) (0.021) (0.039)
University degree (binary) 0.352 0.417 -0.065 0.541 0.463 0.384 0.080 0.210
(0.111) (0.027) (0.105) (0.054) (0.038) (0.062)
Ukrainian native-speaker (binary) 0.058 0.265 -0.207 0.000 0.061 0.221 -0.160 0.011
(0.031) (0.039) (0.047) (0.042) (0.044) (0.058)
Russian native-speaker (binary) 0.404 0.371 0.033 0.780 0.232 0.287 -0.055 0.531
(0.120) (0.038) (0.116) (0.076) (0.052) (0.086)
Moscow Orthodox Church (binary) 0.307 0.173 0.134 0.214 0.506 0.168 0.339 0.037
(0.111) (0.030) (0.105) (0.168) (0.021) (0.154)
Kyiv Orthodox Church (binary) 0.125 0.184 -0.059 0.543 0.051 0.192 -0.142 0.000
(0.101) (0.029) (0.097) (0.017) (0.016) (0.022)
Autocephalous Orthodox Church (binary) 0.159 0.241 -0.082 0.230 0.177 0.357 -0.180 0.140
(0.059) (0.040) (0.067) (0.125) (0.032) (0.118)
Working (binary) 0.552 0.569 -0.017 0.714 0.512 0.528 -0.015 0.749
(0.046) (0.019) (0.046) (0.050) (0.014) (0.048)
Retired (binary) 0.248 0.249 -0.001 0.941 0.268 0.275 -0.007 0.825
(0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.034) (0.009) (0.032)
Single (binary) 0.181 0.166 0.014 0.710 0.122 0.141 -0.019 0.416
(0.039) (0.015) (0.039) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023)
Married or in partnership (binary) 0.610 0.634 -0.024 0.731 0.659 0.614 0.044 0.177
(0.073) (0.021) (0.070) (0.023) (0.024) (0.032)
Material conditions 4.867 4.173 0.694 0.002 4.988 5.103 -0.115 0.761
(1: very good, . . . , 7: terrible) (0.205) (0.073) (0.201) (0.394) (0.102) (0.374)
Note: Each variable is averaged over non-missing values. Standard deviations are clustered on the city level and
reported in parentheses.
Tables 1 and 2 report means and t-test results for covariates and outcomes of interest across
treatment groups in the two periods. It is mostly municipalities with more than 50000 inhabitants
that contribute to our sample. Females represent more than 50 percent of observations and the
average age of the respondents is 45-47 years. The majority have at least secondary education,
follow one of the Orthodox Churches, are employed, and are married or in a partnership. Russian
as native language is more common among respondents than Ukrainian. In both waves, we observe
significantly more Ukrainian native speakers in the low treatment group compared to the high one.
The respondents in the low treatment group reported significantly better material conditions in
2013 but no significant across-group differences are observed in 2015. The low treatment group
includes significantly more followers of the Kyiv Orthodox Church and significantly less followers
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of the Moscow Orthodox Church compared to the high treatment group in 2015. Furthermore,
the proportion of the respondents with secondary specialized education is significantly larger in
the latter. With respect to political attitudes, the high treatment group was significantly more
pro-Russian than the low one in the first wave. In the second period, however, only the sentiments
towards Ukraine remain significantly different across groups.
Table 2: Mean outcome values by minimum distance to Donetsk or Lugansk
2013 2015
<100 km ≥100 km Difference p-value <100 km ≥100 km Difference p-value
Independent, neutral state (binary) 0.193 0.347 -0.153 0.048 0.627 0.434 0.193 0.226
(0.073) (0.031) (0.074) (0.153) (0.071) (0.156)
Union with Russia (binary) 0.591 0.397 0.194 0.022 0.119 0.103 0.016 0.856
(0.077) (0.038) (0.080) (0.095) (0.012) (0.088)
Split into separate states (binary) 0.011 0.014 -0.002 0.776 0.102 0.047 0.055 0.265
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.049) (0.018) (0.048)
Fully the same cultures 5.271 4.023 1.248 0.019 3.526 4.074 -0.548 0.289
(1: fully disagree, . . . , 7: fully agree) (0.452) (0.285) (0.500) (0.489) (0.241) (0.507)
One state with Russia 5.234 3.710 1.524 0.063 2.113 2.482 -0.370 0.398
(1: fully disagree, . . . , 7: fully agree) (0.844) (0.144) (0.783) (0.424) (0.190) (0.431)
I love Ukraine 3.857 4.209 -0.351 0.050 3.902 4.353 -0.451 0.047
(1: definitely no, . . . , 5: definitely yes) (0.179) (0.049) (0.171) (0.226) (0.067) (0.216)
“We” for Ukrainians 3.914 3.950 -0.035 0.794 4.183 4.096 0.087 0.700
(1: definitely no, . . . , 5: definitely yes) (0.124) (0.072) (0.134) (0.216) (0.103) (0.222)
Note: Each variable is averaged over non-missing values. Standard deviations are clustered on the city level and
reported in parentheses.
4 Econometric methods and identification
We use two econometric approaches to infer on the effect of the war on political attitudes and
sentiments, using the two groups with high and low treatment intensity as a function of the
minimum distance to Donetsk or Luhansk as outlined in Section 3. First, we apply a before-after
analysis to examine changes in attitudes for each of the treatment groups over time conditional
on a set of controls, i.e. we compare the outcome variables after the outbreak of the war to those
prior to the war. This approach relies on the assumption that - at least after controlling for the
socioeconomic variables discussed in the previous section - there are no time trends in unobservables
affecting the outcomes of interest between the survey waves 2013 and 2015. Considering a linear
model, the equation to be estimated takes the following form:
Y = β0 + 1{year2015}β1 +X′β2 + U, (1)
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where Y is the outcome, 1{year2015} is an indicator for the year 2015, X is a vector of control
variables, and U is the error term. Coefficient β1 yields the war effect on the outcome of interest.
However, if the assumption of no time trends in unobservables is violated, we cannot separate the
war effect from the trend using the before-after comparison, because 1{year2015} is correlated with
U even conditional on X. Albeit we suspect time trends in political preferences and sentiments to
be rather negligible given our time window of just two years, we cannot rule them out entirely.
Second, we use a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to compare the change in attitudes for
the high treatment group relative to the low treatment group before and after the outbreak of the
war. DiD estimation conventionally assumes (i) that both a treatment and a control group, with
the latter not being exposed to the treatment at all, is available and (ii) that the (hypothetical)
average outcomes of the treated and control groups, if neither group had actually received the
treatment, would follow a common time trend while their levels may differ across groups. As
discussed in Lechner (2011), this is for instance satisfied if the effects of unobservables, which
differ across treatment groups, on the outcome are constant over time. In our empirical context,
however, the assumption of a proper control group with zero treatment intensity does not seem to
hold because the entire country is affected by the conflict in eastern Ukraine through the economic
and social consequences, the recruitment of troops, the discussions in politics, the media, and the
civil society etc.
Adding to the conventional common trend assumption, Fricke (2015) suggests further
restrictions which allow comparing high and low treatment (rather than zero treatment) groups
over time. His approach identifies a lower bound on the absolute magnitude of effect of a high
treatment versus no treatment in the high treatment group even if the no treatment case is not
observed in the data. The identifying assumptions imply that (i) the treatment affects the high
and low treatment groups in the same direction compared to no treatment and (ii) the effect of
the high treatment in the high treatment group is in absolute terms stronger than the effect of
the low treatment in the low treatment group.25 Assuming linearity, DiD estimation is based on
the following regression model:
Y = β0 + 1{year2015}β1 + 1{distance}β2 + 1{distance∗year2015}β3 +X′β4 + U, (2)
25Fricke (2015) also demonstrates that the conventional common trend assumption defined upon treatment ver-
sus no treatment does not even allow point identifying the effect of a high versus a low treatment, unless effect
homogeneity across treatment groups is assumed.
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where Y is the outcome of interest, 1{year2015} is an indicator for the year 2015, 1{distance} is an
indicator for residing within 100 km from either Donetsk or Luhansk, 1{distance∗year2015} is the
interaction of the indicators, X is a vector of control variables, and U is the error term. Under the
stated conditions, coefficient β3 corresponds to the lower bound of the effect of war.
The interpretation of the DiD results presented in Section 5 crucially depends on whether the
mentioned identifying assumptions are satisfied in our empirical context. Given the comparably
strong cultural coherence of the region considered, assuming common trends in political attitudes
toward Russia and Ukraine in the absence of war appears quite plausible, at least after control-
ling for socioeconomic factors like gender, age, employment, education, occupation, and material
conditions. Nevertheless, in one of our robustness checks presented further below, we base our
analysis exclusively on Donbass (and discard the remainder of the east) to make the assumption
even more credible. Furthermore, we also believe that the additional restrictions of Fricke (2015)
are satisfied. First, treatment intensity can likely be ordered as a function of distance to the war
zone, e.g. the likelihood of being exposed to or noticing a military attack should be higher closer to
the front line. Second, the effect of war on political attitudes towards Russia and Ukraine should
(at least on average) have the same sign across subregions of eastern Ukraine.26
We estimate equations (1) and (2) based on OLS, which linearly controls for differences in
observed characteristics. As the linearity assumptions may, however, be violated in reality, we
also consider a semiparametric approach. The latter is based on inverse probability weighting by
the propensity score, i.e. the probability of receiving the treatment conditional on the observed
covariates (see Horvitz and Thompson, 1952; Hirano et al., 2003; Abadie, 2005, in the context of
DiD estimation). In the first step, we estimate the treatment propensity score by logistic regression.
In the second step, we re-weight observations (i) in the high treatment group before the war, (ii)
in the low treatment group before the war, and (iii) in the low treatment group after the outbreak
of the war to match the distribution of covariates in the high treatment group after the outbreak
of the war. Finally, we take differences in the mean differences of the reweighted outcomes within
treatment groups over time. Concerning inference, we use a block bootstrap procedure (with 999
26Inspecting the before-after estimates in the different specifications presented in Section 5 reveals that in most
cases the sign of the estimates is the same for the high and low treatment groups, apart from a few cases with
insignificant results in at least one group. At the same time, the absolute magnitudes of the estimates are mostly
larger in the high treatment group. If time trends were absent such that before-after estimation was unbiased, this
would provide empirical evidence in favor of the additional restrictions in Fricke (2015).
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replications) that accounts for clustering at the municipal level and estimates the standard errors
to be used in the t-statistics based on the bootstrap distributions of the resampled parametric and
semiparametric effect estimates.
At this point, it is important to acknowledge that several of our control variables (e.g. employ-
ment status and material conditions) are likely to be affected by the conflict and thus, endogenous.
For this reason, the next section also presents before-after and DiD estimates without controlling
for X. Despite the obvious tradeoff between dropping covariates at the risk of omitted variable
bias and including covariates at the risk of endogeneity (or selection) bias, the obtained estimates
are often not significantly affected by the choice of X. The same applies to using only a subset of
the observables.27
A final concern for our econometric approaches are sample selection issues due to migration
movements between the two waves that importantly affect the composition of the population in the
area. That is, individuals with particular characteristics might have been more likely to migrate.
For instance, Coupe´ and Obrizan (2016) report that in their sample coming from two cities in
Donetsk, those who stayed and those who temporarily left the cities during military confrontations
differed by age, education level, religiousness and ability to speak both Ukrainian and Russian.
In our models, we control for these and even more characteristics, but sample selection bias in
particular related to unobservables might nevertheless be an issue. For instance, pro-Russian
individuals could have left the government-held territory for Russia or the separatist-held areas,
while pro-Ukrainian individuals might have done vice versa or migrated further away from the
front line within the government-held areas. A specific threat is that the war has induced mass
migration out of Donbass such that the residents in 2015 are not representative for those in 2013
anymore, which would jeopardize both our before-after and DiD analyses.
To judge the relevance of such issues, Table 3 reports the net internal migration in five oblasts
of eastern Ukraine over 2012-2014, as provided by the Statistics Department of Ukraine based on
administrative data on the change of permanent residence.28 While net migration has already been
negative in 2012 and 2013 for Donbass (Luhansk and Donetsk), net out-migration roughly doubled
in the war year of 2014. Quite contrarily, net migration to the remainder of the east considerably
increased in that year, most likely due to incoming migrants from Donbass. In 2015, all oblasts
27These results are not reported but available on request.
28The regional Departments of Statistics provided us with the internal migration data on the city level but for the
cities in Donetsk oblast the archive 2013 was left in Donetsk and thus currently inaccessible
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but for Kharkiv oblast experienced net out-migration. Even though we do see a noticeable change
in net migration patterns during the war, the movements out of Donbass, for instance, appear
moderate compared to the overall population of the area (roughly 6.6 million in 2013,29 including
both government- and separatist-held territories). As an important caveat, however, the statistics
do not cover migrants or refugees that did not register in their destination municipality. For this
reason, we also consider information from the Interagency Headquarters, a governmental agency
that provides estimates for the number of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a consequence
of the events in Crimea and Donbass. As of 31 March 2015 it is claimed that there were 810060 IDPs
in total, including 789670 from Donbass,30 which is a much higher figure than the administrative
records indicate. As shown in Figure 2, the highest number of IDPs has been accommodated in
eastern Ukraine. In addition to internal migration, many Ukrainians also fled to Russia, starting
from 2014. Table 4 illustrates a dramatic increase in the number of Ukrainians registered with the
legal status of refugee or temporary asylum in Russia which reached 311407 at the end of 2015.
Table 3: Net internal migration (persons) in the east of Ukraine over 2012-2015
Oblasts 2012 2013 2014 2015
Dnipropetrovsk -1564 -2169 431 -1177
Donetsk -4449 -4516 -10677 -9440
Kharkiv 1984 1741 8261 2739
Luhansk -4034 -4365 -8120 -5811
Zaporizhia -1361 -1916 -847 -995
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine: www.
ukrstat.gov.ua.
In the light of these migration flows, one could on the one hand argue that migration might
create attenuation bias in the main findings of our analysis, namely the negative DiD effects on
political attitudes towards Russia. If pro-Ukrainian individuals left the war-affected areas to re-
29The average population in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts is provided by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine:
www.ukrstat.gov.ua, retrieved 23 April 2016.
30This information is published at the governmental portal: www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_
id=248052970&cat_id=244277212, retrieved 23 April 2016. The “Ukraine Migration Profile 2014” with the numbers
of IDPs for all oblasts as of 31 December 2014 is available at: www.dmsu.gov.ua/images/files/profile_2015_en.
pdf, retrieved 23 April 2016.
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settle somewhere else in eastern Ukraine, the drop in the support of Russia would be overesti-
mated in the low treatment group (either through the migrants themselves or through interaction
effects with locals) and underestimated in the high treatment group. This would squeeze the ab-
solute magnitude of the negative DiD estimates. On the other hand, this could be countervailed
by pro-Russian individuals leaving the war-affected area for territories outside the control of the
Ukrainian government, in particular Russia. In this context, it is worth noting that the figures
suggest that migration to Russia was lower than to other Ukrainian regions, such that we suspect
attenuation bias to be the more relevant threat. This suggests (similarly to our identifying as-
sumptions outlined below) that our main DiD effects on attitudes towards Russia are in absolute
magnitude lower bounds for the true effects. Again, we notice that our estimates are not very
sensitive to the choice of the socioeconomic characteristics, which one would suspect to correlate
with migration decisions.
Figure 2: Internally displaced persons in thousands by destination region as of 31 March 2015
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60.742Zaporizhia
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Source: Governmental Portal: www.kmu.gov.ua.
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Table 4: Ukrainians registered with refugee or temporary asylum status in Russia over 2012-2015
Status 2012 2013 2014 2015
Refugee 5 5 229 273
Temporary asylum 0 0 231558 311134
Total 5 5 231787 311407
Source: General Administration for Migration
Issues of the Interior Ministry of Russia:
http://xn--b1ab2a0a.xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/about/
activity/stats/Statistics/Predostavlenie_
ubezhishha_v_Rossijskoj.
5 Main results and sensitivity checks
We present the results for before-after and DiD estimation based on (i) unconditional mean dif-
ferences, which corresponds to setting X empty in equations (1) and (2), (ii) OLS controlling for
the socioeconomic factors mentioned in Section 3, and (iii) propensity score weighting. This en-
tails altogether nine different estimators. Table 5 provides the estimates for our main specification,
namely when a road distance of 100 km is used to distinguish between the high and low treatment
groups. Columns 1-2, 4-5, and 7-8 show the before-after estimates for the high and low treatment
groups separately, whereas columns 3, 6, and 9 display the DiD estimates. Columns 1-3 contain
the estimates without controls, columns 4-6 present the OLS estimates controlling for the covari-
ates, and columns 7-9 report the conditional semiparametric results based on weighting.
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Table 5: Estimates for a distance threshold of 100 km
No controls OLS Propensity score weighting
<100 km ≥100 km DiD <100 km ≥100 km DiD <100 km ≥100 km DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Independent, neutral state 0.434 0.087 0.347 0.398 0.047 0.351 0.442 0.140 0.301
se 0.192 0.071 0.201 0.211 0.068 0.221 0.209 0.083 0.241
p-value 0.024 0.217 0.085 0.060 0.493 0.112 0.035 0.091 0.212
observations 147 1555 1702 130 1474 1604 130 1474 1604
Union with Russia -0.472 -0.294 -0.178 -0.445 -0.303 -0.143 -0.488 -0.317 -0.172
se 0.114 0.039 0.119 0.478 0.036 0.481 0.195 0.100 0.223
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.135 0.352 0.000 0.767 0.012 0.002 0.442
observations 147 1555 1702 130 1474 1604 130 1474 1604
Split into separate states 0.090 0.033 0.057 0.108 0.024 0.084 0.095 0.022 0.073
se 0.047 0.018 0.050 0.493 0.015 0.493 0.059 0.034 0.062
p-value 0.053 0.058 0.249 0.827 0.108 0.864 0.107 0.517 0.237
observations 147 1555 1702 130 1474 1604 130 1474 1604
Fully the same cultures -1.745 0.050 -1.796 -1.745 -0.039 -1.707 -1.978 0.477 -2.455
se 0.674 0.329 0.760 0.833 0.347 0.904 0.983 0.691 1.352
p-value 0.010 0.879 0.018 0.036 0.911 0.059 0.044 0.490 0.069
observations 174 1807 1981 156 1699 1855 156 1699 1855
One state with Russia -3.121 -1.227 -1.894 -3.285 -1.248 -2.036 -3.550 -1.071 -2.479
se 1.020 0.236 1.032 1.096 0.263 1.134 1.246 0.620 1.559
p-value 0.002 0.000 0.066 0.003 0.000 0.072 0.004 0.084 0.112
observations 165 1675 1840 146 1576 1722 146 1576 1722
I love Ukraine 0.045 0.144 -0.099 0.182 0.175 0.007 0.299 0.127 0.172
se 0.361 0.060 0.365 0.375 0.063 0.382 0.417 0.163 0.453
p-value 0.900 0.016 0.786 0.628 0.006 0.985 0.474 0.436 0.704
observations 187 1886 2073 166 1768 1934 166 1768 1934
“We” for Ukrainians 0.269 0.146 0.122 0.287 0.139 0.148 0.363 0.048 0.315
se 0.212 0.097 0.232 0.262 0.109 0.284 0.280 0.212 0.316
p-value 0.206 0.129 0.598 0.273 0.201 0.602 0.194 0.819 0.319
observations 187 1886 2073 166 1768 1934 166 1768 1934
Note: Observations < 100 km to Donetsk or Luhansk form the high treatment group, while those ≥ 100 km
form the low treatment group. Propensity scores are estimated by logistic regression. Standard errors are
clustered on the city level using 999 bootstrap replications.
OLS and weighting deliver in general quite similar results in terms of effect magnitudes and
directions. We found mostly no statistically significant shift in the sympathy towards Ukraine and
self-association with Ukrainians, except for the positive and statistically significant effects based
on OLS and estimation without controls regarding I love towards Ukraine in the low treatment
group. In contrast, several statistically significantly negative associations were found between the
proximity to the war zone and political attitudes towards Russia, which is somewhat in line with
the finding of Coupe´ and Obrizan (2016) that the experience of property damage decreases the
support for the view that the Ukrainian government should compromise with Russia. For instance,
the high treatment group’s support for the statement that Ukrainian and Russian cultures are fully
the same weakened over time. While no significant change is observed in the low treatment group,
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the DiD effects based on the inter-group changes in the common culture outcome over time are
significantly negative at the 10% level.
Furthermore, the support for forming one common state between Ukraine and Russia signifi-
cantly declined in either treatment group. The DiD estimates are also marginally significant, sug-
gesting that the deterioration was larger in areas closer to the war zone. Moreover, the before-after
estimates for having a preference for a political union with Russia are (with the exception of the
OLS result for the high treatment group) significantly negative. In contrast, none of the corre-
sponding DiD estimates is statistically significant. The share of those in the high treatment group
who prefer Ukraine to remain an independent and neutral state increased significantly over time
and also the DiD estimate is marginally significant for OLS and estimation without controls. In
line with Coupe´ and Obrizan (2016), the preference to split Ukraine into separate states appears
to have increased in the high treatment group, while the DiD estimate is never significant. To sum
up, both the before-after and DiD estimates suggest that the political attitudes towards Russia
have deteriorated as a consequence of the war, while this is not the case for sentiments towards
Ukraine. For visualization, Figure A2 in Appendix displays the frequency distributions of the non-
binary outcomes in the high treatment group over time: there was a negative shift in sentiments
towards Russia but no pronounced change with respect to Ukraine.
We run several sensitivity checks to investigate the robustness of our results with respect to the
distance-based definition of the treatment groups. First, we examine the results when excluding
Mariupol - a city located 113 km from Donetsk but nevertheless very close to the front line (see
Figure 1) - from the low treatment group. Second, we vary the definition of the low treatment group
as a function of distance. Specifically, we only use observations beyond 200 km from either Donetsk
or Luhansk, which implies a distance window of 100 km between the high and low treatment groups
that is no longer used in the analysis. Third, we base the analysis exclusively on municipalities in
Donbass, to maximize cultural and geographic proximity. Fourth, we move the distance threshold
for defining the high and low treatment group to 150 km which affects the composition of either
group. Finally, we define the treatment not as a function of distance but based on reported military
confrontations in four Donbass cities in our sample (i.e. Artemivsk, Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk
and Mariupol) to distinguish between the high and low treatment groups.
Table 6 contains the estimates when Mariupol is excluded from the low treatment group while
the high treatment group and its before-after estimates remain unaffected. The estimates are
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quite comparable to the previous results. For instance, we observe similar patterns in terms of
sentiments towards Ukraine and Ukrainians, i.g. no significant DiD estimates. Furthermore, we
find negative and mostly significant before-after and DiD estimates concerning a common state
of Ukraine and Russia, negative DiD estimates on the perception of the Ukrainian and Russian
cultures as fully the same, and negative before-after estimates on the preferences of both groups
for a union with Russia.
Table 6: Estimates for a distance threshold of 100 km when excluding Mariupol
No controls OLS Propensity score weighting
<100 km ≥100 km DiD <100 km ≥100 km DiD <100 km ≥100 km DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Independent, neutral state 0.434 0.100 0.334 0.398 0.056 0.342 0.442 0.151 0.291
se 0.192 0.077 0.206 0.216 0.077 0.231 0.210 0.083 0.239
p-value 0.024 0.193 0.106 0.065 0.470 0.139 0.036 0.068 0.225
observations 147 1447 1594 130 1370 1500 130 1370 1500
Union with Russia -0.472 -0.300 -0.172 -0.445 -0.307 -0.138 -0.488 -0.319 -0.169
se 0.119 0.039 0.125 0.590 0.037 0.593 0.191 0.105 0.218
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.168 0.451 0.000 0.815 0.010 0.002 0.438
observations 147 1447 1594 130 1370 1500 130 1370 1500
Split into separate states 0.090 0.020 0.071 0.108 0.011 0.097 0.095 0.016 0.079
se 0.045 0.013 0.047 0.429 0.010 0.430 0.063 0.023 0.065
p-value 0.044 0.132 0.136 0.802 0.261 0.822 0.131 0.492 0.223
observations 147 1447 1594 130 1370 1500 130 1370 1500
Fully the same cultures -1.745 0.073 -1.818 -1.745 -0.001 -1.744 -1.978 0.498 -2.476
se 0.692 0.364 0.768 0.857 0.376 0.921 0.986 0.691 1.301
p-value 0.012 0.841 0.018 0.042 0.998 0.058 0.045 0.471 0.057
observations 174 1674 1848 156 1571 1727 156 1571 1727
One state with Russia -3.121 -1.211 -1.911 -3.285 -1.204 -2.081 -3.550 -1.062 -2.488
se 1.034 0.259 1.065 1.084 0.292 1.125 1.170 0.654 1.500
p-value 0.003 0.000 0.073 0.002 0.000 0.064 0.002 0.104 0.097
observations 165 1572 1737 146 1478 1624 146 1478 1624
I love Ukraine 0.045 0.155 -0.110 0.182 0.199 -0.017 0.299 0.153 0.146
se 0.358 0.067 0.363 0.382 0.064 0.386 0.420 0.163 0.439
p-value 0.899 0.020 0.762 0.634 0.002 0.965 0.477 0.348 0.740
observations 187 1750 1937 166 1637 1803 166 1637 1803
“We” for Ukrainians 0.269 0.197 0.072 0.287 0.194 0.093 0.363 0.085 0.278
se 0.206 0.088 0.230 0.251 0.106 0.270 0.275 0.223 0.314
p-value 0.192 0.026 0.755 0.252 0.067 0.730 0.187 0.703 0.375
observations 187 1750 1937 166 1637 1803 166 1637 1803
Note: Observations < 100 km to Donetsk or Luhansk form the high treatment group, while those ≥ 100 km
form the low treatment group. Propensity scores are estimated by logistic regression. Standard errors are
clustered on the city level using 999 bootstrap replications.
Table 7 presents the effects when reducing the low treatment group to observations more than
200 km away from Donetsk or Luhansk. The before-after estimates for the low treatment group are
only marginally affected while the high treatment group is the same as in the main specification.
Therefore, the DiD results are barely affected. Specifically, the DiD estimates on the similarity of
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the Ukrainian and Russian cultures and on the support of a common state are again significantly
negative at the 10 or 5% level, as well as the before-after estimates for a common union between
Ukraine and Russia.
Table 7: Estimates when excluding cities between 100 km and 200 km
No controls OLS Propensity score weighting
<100 km ≥200 km DiD <100 km ≥200 km DiD <100 km ≥200 km DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Independent, neutral state 0.434 0.068 0.366 0.398 0.027 0.372 0.442 0.138 0.303
se 0.196 0.089 0.218 0.206 0.081 0.224 0.201 0.096 0.238
p-value 0.027 0.443 0.094 0.054 0.742 0.097 0.028 0.147 0.203
observations 147 1275 1422 130 1209 1339 130 1209 1339
Union with Russia -0.472 -0.302 -0.170 -0.445 -0.312 -0.134 -0.488 -0.306 -0.182
se 0.117 0.043 0.124 0.447 0.041 0.449 0.197 0.122 0.237
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.171 0.319 0.000 0.766 0.013 0.012 0.442
observations 147 1275 1422 130 1209 1339 130 1209 1339
Split into separate states 0.090 0.021 0.069 0.108 0.013 0.095 0.095 0.015 0.079
se 0.045 0.014 0.047 0.353 0.011 0.354 0.058 0.018 0.059
p-value 0.046 0.115 0.146 0.760 0.217 0.789 0.101 0.386 0.176
observations 147 1275 1422 130 1209 1339 130 1209 1339
Fully the same cultures -1.745 0.174 -1.919 -1.745 0.131 -1.876 -1.978 0.695 -2.672
se 0.692 0.397 0.820 0.809 0.400 0.904 0.966 0.722 1.336
p-value 0.012 0.661 0.019 0.031 0.744 0.038 0.041 0.336 0.045
observations 174 1486 1660 156 1397 1553 156 1397 1553
One state with Russia -3.121 -1.170 -1.951 -3.285 -1.185 -2.100 -3.550 -0.918 -2.633
se 1.072 0.288 1.107 1.071 0.315 1.112 1.200 0.623 1.494
p-value 0.004 0.000 0.078 0.002 0.000 0.059 0.003 0.141 0.078
observations 165 1395 1560 146 1314 1460 146 1314 1460
I love Ukraine 0.045 0.188 -0.143 0.182 0.224 -0.042 0.299 0.154 0.145
se 0.349 0.065 0.352 0.377 0.065 0.381 0.417 0.165 0.439
p-value 0.897 0.004 0.685 0.630 0.001 0.912 0.473 0.353 0.741
observations 187 1553 1740 166 1456 1622 166 1456 1622
“We” for Ukrainians 0.269 0.203 0.066 0.287 0.194 0.093 0.363 0.116 0.247
se 0.203 0.081 0.223 0.246 0.113 0.266 0.272 0.228 0.313
p-value 0.185 0.013 0.768 0.242 0.086 0.726 0.181 0.610 0.430
observations 187 1553 1740 166 1456 1622 166 1456 1622
Note: Observations < 100 km to Donetsk or Luhansk form the high treatment group, while those ≥ 200 km
form the low treatment group. Propensity scores are estimated by logistic regression. Standard errors are
clustered on the city level using 999 bootstrap replications.
In Table 8, we report the estimates for the Donbass subsample with at most 193 observations
in the high treatment group versus 187 observations in the low treatment group, given the distance
threshold of 100 km as in the main specification. This sensitivity check is motivated by the potential
concern that Donbass is, despite many historical and cultural similarities with the remainder of the
east, nevertheless distinct from other regions in a way that makes the common trend assumption
fail when relying on the observations outside of Donbass. Statistical power is now considerably
lower due to the substantially smaller sample size, and none of the conditional DiD estimates is
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statistically significant at the 10% level. It is nevertheless reassuring that the magnitudes are
qualitatively in line with the previous key findings. They again suggest that the preferences for
political ties with Russia have weakened.
Table 8: Estimates for Donbass only with a distance threshold of 100 km
No controls OLS Propensity score weighting
<100 km ≥100 km DiD <100 km ≥100 km DiD <100 km ≥100 km DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Independent, neutral state 0.434 0.031 0.403 0.398 0.028 0.370 0.442 0.007 0.435
se 0.185 0.147 0.236 0.182 0.140 0.230 0.199 0.322 0.403
p-value 0.019 0.832 0.087 0.029 0.840 0.108 0.027 0.982 0.280
observations 147 157 304 130 150 280 130 150 280
Union with Russia -0.472 -0.191 -0.282 -0.445 -0.161 -0.285 -0.488 -0.337 -0.151
se 0.106 0.093 0.143 0.210 0.345 0.405 0.182 0.231 0.301
p-value 0.000 0.041 0.049 0.034 0.641 0.483 0.007 0.145 0.616
observations 147 157 304 130 150 280 130 150 280
Split into separate states 0.090 0.126 -0.035 0.108 0.037 0.071 0.095 0.095 0.000
se 0.044 0.090 0.097 0.155 0.082 0.175 0.053 0.237 0.238
p-value 0.040 0.161 0.716 0.487 0.655 0.686 0.074 0.688 0.999
observations 147 157 304 130 150 280 130 150 280
Fully the same cultures -1.745 -0.485 -1.260 -1.745 -0.520 -1.226 -1.978 -0.541 -1.436
se 0.671 0.324 0.743 0.768 0.555 0.975 0.967 0.597 1.165
p-value 0.009 0.135 0.090 0.023 0.349 0.209 0.041 0.365 0.218
observations 174 189 363 156 181 337 156 181 337
One state with Russia -3.121 -1.465 -1.656 -3.285 -1.211 -2.073 -3.550 -1.414 -2.136
se 1.025 0.560 1.186 1.051 1.045 1.453 1.222 0.953 1.642
p-value 0.002 0.009 0.162 0.002 0.246 0.154 0.004 0.138 0.193
observations 165 156 321 146 148 294 146 148 294
I love Ukraine 0.045 -0.021 0.066 0.182 0.034 0.148 0.299 0.066 0.233
se 0.342 0.417 0.547 0.344 0.767 0.831 0.388 0.484 0.641
p-value 0.895 0.960 0.904 0.597 0.965 0.859 0.441 0.892 0.716
observations 187 193 380 166 185 351 166 185 351
“We” for Ukrainians 0.269 -0.438 0.707 0.287 -0.304 0.591 0.363 -0.044 0.407
se 0.201 0.637 0.669 0.223 0.875 0.898 0.254 0.843 0.901
p-value 0.182 0.492 0.291 0.197 0.728 0.510 0.153 0.959 0.652
observations 187 193 380 166 185 351 166 185 351
Note: Observations < 100 km to Donetsk or Luhansk form the high treatment group, while those ≥ 100 km
form the low treatment group. Propensity scores are estimated by logistic regression. Standard errors are
clustered on the city level using 999 bootstrap replications.
Next, we shift the distance threshold further away from the front zone. Thus, the high treatment
group expands to seven municipalities in Donbass while the low treatment group is now reduced
accordingly. Table 9 provides the results. For most variables, the magnitudes of the before-after
estimates in the high treatment group decrease while the sizes of those for the low treatment
group increase compared to Table 5. Therefore, this specification generally yields smaller and less
statistically significant DiD estimates than the main specification, but nevertheless qualitatively
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similar. The negative before-after estimates for a union, as well as for forming one state with
Russia remain statistically significant for either treatment group. In the high treatment group, the
before-after estimates for belonging to the same culture are borderline significant. The negative
DiD estimates for belonging to the same culture are also marginally significant in two out of three
cases, while the ones on forming one state are not any more.
Table 9: Estimates for a distance threshold of 150 km
No controls OLS Propensity score weighting
<150 km ≥150 km DiD <150 km ≥150 km DiD <150 km ≥150 km DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Independent, neutral state 0.218 0.093 0.126 0.259 0.048 0.211 0.308 0.163 0.144
se 0.178 0.076 0.193 0.163 0.077 0.181 0.159 0.084 0.174
p-value 0.219 0.221 0.515 0.113 0.530 0.243 0.053 0.052 0.406
observations 281 1421 1702 258 1346 1604 258 1346 1604
Union with Russia -0.358 -0.306 -0.052 -0.358 -0.311 -0.046 -0.402 -0.357 -0.045
se 0.102 0.040 0.109 0.117 0.039 0.122 0.159 0.074 0.179
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.633 0.002 0.000 0.703 0.012 0.000 0.800
observations 281 1421 1702 258 1346 1604 258 1346 1604
Split into separate states 0.128 0.022 0.106 0.116 0.013 0.103 0.103 0.017 0.086
se 0.049 0.012 0.051 0.250 0.010 0.250 0.062 0.015 0.064
p-value 0.009 0.084 0.037 0.643 0.210 0.680 0.097 0.251 0.181
observations 281 1421 1702 258 1346 1604 258 1346 1604
Fully the same cultures -1.183 0.094 -1.278 -1.109 0.027 -1.136 -1.054 0.159 -1.213
se 0.565 0.361 0.672 0.584 0.380 0.698 0.669 0.533 0.976
p-value 0.036 0.794 0.057 0.057 0.943 0.104 0.115 0.766 0.214
observations 335 1646 1981 310 1545 1855 310 1545 1855
One state with Russia -2.363 -1.229 -1.134 -2.489 -1.214 -1.275 -2.463 -1.178 -1.284
se 0.796 0.260 0.823 0.876 0.285 0.926 0.992 0.493 1.214
p-value 0.003 0.000 0.168 0.005 0.000 0.168 0.013 0.017 0.290
observations 295 1545 1840 269 1453 1722 269 1453 1722
I love Ukraine -0.018 0.177 -0.195 0.088 0.216 -0.128 0.074 0.143 -0.069
se 0.264 0.059 0.271 0.255 0.061 0.263 0.268 0.123 0.314
p-value 0.945 0.003 0.471 0.729 0.000 0.627 0.782 0.245 0.827
observations 352 1721 2073 324 1610 1934 324 1610 1934
“We” for Ukrainians -0.243 0.235 -0.478 -0.141 0.223 -0.364 -0.185 0.128 -0.313
se 0.299 0.088 0.310 0.249 0.112 0.272 0.293 0.199 0.348
p-value 0.416 0.007 0.124 0.570 0.046 0.180 0.527 0.521 0.369
observations 352 1721 2073 324 1610 1934 324 1610 1934
Note: Observations < 150 km to Donetsk or Luhansk form the high treatment group, while those ≥ 150 km
form the low treatment group. Propensity scores are estimated by logistic regression. Standard errors are
clustered on the city level using 999 bootstrap replications.
For four of the cities in the Donetsk oblast that are included in our sample, we found that they
directly experienced military confrontations in 2014 based on Internet research and checks of the
movement of the front according to the maps of the Information Analysis Center of the National
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. In a further robustness check, we assign these cities to
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the high treatment group, while all remaining cities in our sample form the low treatment group.
The cities in the newly defined high treatment group are located close to the front line, i.e. less
than 100 km to Donetsk or Luhansk except for Mariupol. Therefore, the results in Table 10 are
mostly in line with the results of the main specification, albeit generally less significant. In partic-
ular, while the negative OLS based-DiD effects on the common culture and one state outcomes are
borderline significant, the weighting-based estimates are quite imprecise, albeit similar in magni-
tude. We conclude that our battery of robustness checks by and large confirms the findings of the
main specification, namely that the political capital of Russia decreased in the government-held
territories in eastern Ukraine affected by the war, while mostly no statistically significant effects
are found with respect to sentiments towards Ukraine.
Table 10: Estimates for military confrontations
No controls OLS Propensity score weighting
battle no battle DiD battle no battle DiD battle no battle DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Independent, neutral state 0.105 0.116 -0.011 0.155 0.075 0.080 0.209 0.165 0.045
se 0.241 0.074 0.253 0.309 0.076 0.321 0.218 0.108 0.252
p-value 0.663 0.115 0.964 0.616 0.323 0.804 0.337 0.126 0.859
observations 207 1495 1702 194 1410 1604 194 1410 1604
Union with Russia -0.426 -0.300 -0.126 -0.476 -0.307 -0.168 -0.582 -0.365 -0.217
se 0.146 0.039 0.151 1.000 0.037 1.000 0.212 0.121 0.271
p-value 0.004 0.000 0.403 0.634 0.000 0.866 0.006 0.003 0.423
observations 207 1495 1702 194 1410 1604 194 1410 1604
Split into separate states 0.167 0.021 0.146 0.168 0.012 0.155 0.144 0.008 0.136
se 0.047 0.012 0.048 0.750 0.010 0.750 0.1 0.028 0.101
p-value 0.000 0.090 0.002 0.823 0.214 0.836 0.15 0.762 0.179
observations 207 1495 1702 194 1410 1604 194 1410 1604
Fully the same cultures -1.299 0.049 -1.348 -1.380 -0.021 -1.359 -1.166 0.078 -1.244
se 0.784 0.347 0.862 0.749 0.364 0.833 0.842 0.725 1.338
p-value 0.097 0.889 0.118 0.065 0.954 0.103 0.166 0.914 0.352
observations 256 1725 1981 239 1616 1855 239 1616 1855
One state with Russia -3.094 -1.189 -1.905 -3.161 -1.205 -1.956 -3.18 -1.121 -2.059
se 0.913 0.246 0.933 1.053 0.277 1.098 1.208 0.715 1.555
p-value 0.001 0.000 0.041 0.003 0.000 0.075 0.008 0.117 0.186
observations 217 1623 1840 200 1522 1722 200 1522 1722
I love Ukraine 0.078 0.161 -0.083 0.088 0.211 -0.123 0.081 0.123 -0.042
se 0.353 0.064 0.357 0.437 0.063 0.441 0.426 0.175 0.438
p-value 0.824 0.012 0.817 0.841 0.001 0.780 0.849 0.483 0.924
observations 270 1803 2073 252 1682 1934 252 1682 1934
“We” for Ukrainians -0.139 0.200 -0.338 -0.091 0.204 -0.295 -0.156 0.015 -0.171
se 0.312 0.088 0.325 0.310 0.107 0.328 0.294 0.206 0.349
p-value 0.657 0.024 0.298 0.769 0.057 0.368 0.595 0.943 0.625
observations 270 1803 2073 252 1682 1934 252 1682 1934
Note: Military confrontations in 2014 were reported for Artemivsk, Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk and
Mariupol. Propensity scores are estimated by logistic regression. Standard errors are clustered on
the city level using 999 bootstrap replications.
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To investigate effect heterogeneity across language, Table A5 in the Appendix presents our
main analysis for the subsample of native Russian speakers, who could differ in attitudes and
effects from native Ukrainian speakers. However, the results are qualitatively similar to those in
the total sample. Furthermore, we examine effect heterogeneity across age groups by considering
the subsample below the median age of 45 in the evaluation sample. Table A6 in Appendix
displays the obtained results that are in line with those in the whole sample. As a final check,
we examined whether item non-response in the outcome variables is selective in our sample, i.e.
varies systematically over time and across treatment groups. For this purpose, we created missing
dummies for our outcomes of interest and used them as dependent variables in our estimators. We
generally found no evidence for selective item non-response within treatment groups over time or
across time trends of treatment groups (see Table A7 in Appendix).
6 Placebo tests
To complement the sensitivity checks, we conduct two placebo tests for our DiD approach in which
we assign treatment based on distance to a certain municipality in a region relatively far from
the war zone such that war exposure should be perceived as equally low in the entire region. A
further criterion is that the region should be culturally rather homogeneous and should not ex-
perience a large inflow of IDPs from the war zone (see Figure 2). For these reasons, we picked
two regions in the north and the west center of Ukraine (see Figure 3). Following the historically
motivated definitions in Denisova-Schmidt and Huber (2014), the northern region includes Cherni-
hiv, Sumy, Poltava, Cherkasy, and Kirovohrad oblasts; the west central region consists of Volyn,
Rivno, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytsk, and Vinnytsia oblasts. Within each region, the placebo groups
with the high and low treatment are defined based on the road distance (by car) to a particular
city chosen to meet two criteria: first, it is not one of Ukrainian major cities in terms of political or
military power; second, the resulting placebo groups include a sufficient number of observations to
implement the DiD approach. For the north of Ukraine, we consider the distance to Oleksandria
(Kirovohrad oblast); for the west center, we take the distance to Zhytomyr (Zhytomyr oblast).
Only the cities observed in both survey waves enter our sample, i.e. 18 cities in the west center
region and 14 cities in the north.
We compare observations within a 100 km radius from the respective target city to those further
away in each region and apply the same three DiD approaches as used in the previous section.
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Tables A8 and A9 in Appendix provide the results. Almost all DiD estimates are insignificant
at any conventional level, with the exception of the effects on a union with Russia when not
controlling for any observed covariates. Our two placebo studies therefore generally support our
main econometric approach, which hinges on the assumption that it is the proximity to the war
zone which crucially determines the effect of the conflict on political attitudes.
Figure 3: Placebo regions
Note: The west center and the north of Ukraine are highlighted in green and blue,
respectively.
7 Conclusion
This paper examined the impact of the military conflict in Donbass on the political attitudes to-
wards Ukraine and Russia of the population living close to the front line in eastern Ukraine. Pref-
erences about the future political status of Ukraine, their sentiments towards Ukrainian-Russian
relations, as well as self-association with Ukraine and other Ukrainians were at the center of this
study. The analysis was based on unique repeated cross sectional data collected from the regions
controlled by the Ukrainian authorities a year before and after the outbreak of the war in spring
2014. We applied two econometric strategies to infer on the causal effect of war intensity, based on
two treatment groups distinguished by their proximity to the region’s major cities of Donetsk or
Luhansk situated close to the front line. First, we performed before-after comparisons that assume
the absence of time trends in the outcome variables in either group. Second, we used a difference-
in-differences (DiD) approach for multiple treatment intensities that under specific assumptions
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estimates a lower bound of the causal effect. We considered both estimation without controlling
for covariates, as well as OLS and semiparametric inverse probability weighting by the propensity
score which condition on a range of socioeconomic characteristics.
In line with previous findings in the literature, the results suggested that exposure to war affects
political preferences and attitudes. Specifically, the conflict in Donbass appears to have negatively
affected attitudes towards Russia among the people living in the government-held parts of Donbass
close to the front line. The before-after differences in supporting a political union with Russia and
in stating that Ukraine and Russia form be one state were negative and statistically significant at
the 5% level in all but one of the main specifications. Furthermore, for the latter outcome and
the judgement that the Ukrainian and Russian cultures are the same, the DiD approach yielded
sizable negative effects that were significant at the 10% level in the majority of regressions. In
contrast, we did not find strong evidence that the war affected sentiments towards Ukraine or self-
association with other Ukrainians. A number of robustness checks and placebo tests confirmed
our main results and did not refute our DiD method.
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A Appendix
Table A1: Choice of the evaluation sample (east of Ukraine)
Observations
2013 2015 Total
Nationwide sample 6000 6000 12000
Entire sample for the east 1915 1545 3460
Excluded villages 284 264 548
Excluded cities 711 128 839
Evaluation sample 920 1153 2073
Note: The nationwide sample includes all regions of
Ukraine. The entire sample for the east of Ukraine
covers observed cities and villages in Dnipropetrovsk,
Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk and Zaporizhia oblasts.
The evaluation sample consists of the cities observed
in the east of Ukraine in both waves.
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Table A2: Mean covariate values in 2013 by city inclusion status
Donbass Remainder of the east
Included Excluded Difference p-value Included Excluded Difference p-value
City size: <50 000 citizens (binary) 0.235 0.359 -0.124 0.492 0.147 1.000 -0.853 0.000
(0.148) (0.111) (0.179) (0.071) (0.000) (0.071)
Female (binary) 0.559 0.576 -0.017 0.248 0.556 0.539 0.017 0.290
(0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) (0.016)
Age 46.011 46.446 -0.435 0.499 44.995 46.183 -1.188 0.186
(0.499) (0.426) (0.636) (0.324) (0.847) (0.875)
Secondary specialized education (binary) 0.419 0.450 -0.031 0.576 0.377 0.348 0.029 0.422
(0.044) (0.035) (0.054) (0.020) (0.030) (0.035)
University degree (binary) 0.346 0.329 0.018 0.806 0.425 0.296 0.129 0.052
(0.063) (0.038) (0.071) (0.028) (0.060) (0.064)
Ukrainian native-speaker (binary) 0.130 0.057 0.072 0.126 0.268 0.270 -0.001 0.989
(0.046) (0.014) (0.046) (0.043) (0.082) (0.090)
Russian native-speaker (binary) 0.396 0.541 -0.145 0.127 0.370 0.183 0.187 0.005
(0.079) (0.054) (0.093) (0.042) (0.047) (0.061)
Moscow Orthodox Church (binary) 0.263 0.352 -0.089 0.227 0.169 0.182 -0.013 0.878
(0.068) (0.032) (0.073) (0.034) (0.079) (0.083)
Kyiv Orthodox Church (binary) 0.119 0.109 0.010 0.867 0.192 0.064 0.129 0.010
(0.053) (0.032) (0.060) (0.031) (0.036) (0.046)
Autocephalous Orthodox Church (binary) 0.163 0.234 -0.071 0.323 0.249 0.300 -0.051 0.681
(0.054) (0.050) (0.071) (0.043) (0.120) (0.123)
Working (binary) 0.531 0.572 -0.041 0.454 0.576 0.574 0.002 0.960
(0.027) (0.048) (0.055) (0.020) (0.044) (0.046)
Retired (binary) 0.279 0.282 -0.003 0.941 0.242 0.278 -0.037 0.196
(0.018) (0.030) (0.034) (0.014) (0.025) (0.028)
Single (binary) 0.162 0.133 0.029 0.327 0.170 0.130 0.039 0.185
(0.026) (0.016) (0.030) (0.016) (0.025) (0.029)
Married or in partnership (binary) 0.609 0.720 -0.111 0.034 0.636 0.661 -0.025 0.613
(0.048) (0.021) (0.050) (0.023) (0.044) (0.048)
Material conditions 4.648 4.228 0.420 0.068 4.157 4.496 -0.339 0.040
(1: very good, . . . , 7: terrible) (0.192) (0.128) (0.223) (0.080) (0.141) (0.048)
Note: Each variable is averaged over non-missing values. Standard errors are clustered on the city level and reported
in parentheses.
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Table A3: Mean outcome values in 2013 by city inclusion status
Donbass Remainder of the east
Included Excluded Difference p-value Included Excluded Difference p-value
Independent, neutral state (binary) 0.227 0.236 -0.009 0.880 0.354 0.297 0.057 0.449
(0.053) (0.030) (0.058) (0.034) (0.023) (0.146)
Union with Russia (binary) 0.473 0.569 -0.096 0.319 0.406 0.376 0.030 0.762
(0.094) (0.031) (0.095) (0.040) (0.093) (0.097)
Split into separate states (binary) 0.020 0.016 0.004 0.707 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.014
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) na (0.004)
Fully the same cultures 4.805 4.139 0.665 0.164 4.006 4.478 -0.472 0.361
(1: fully disagree, . . . , 7: fully agree) (0.459) (0.170) (0.468) (0.313) (0.419) (0.508)
One state with Russia 4.804 4.118 0.686 0.252 3.666 3.951 -0.286 0.511
(1: fully disagree, . . . , 7: fully agree) (0.591) (0.177) (0.588) (0.156) (0.416) (0.429)
I love Ukraine 3.838 4.030 -0.192 0.166 4.248 4.504 -0.256 0.066
(1: definitely no, . . . , 5: definitely yes) (0.125) (0.066) (0.136) (0.039) (0.133) (0.133)
“We” for Ukrainians 3.905 3.765 0.140 0.346 3.955 4.365 -0.410 0.018
(1: definitely no, . . . , 5: definitely yes) (0.128) (0.082) (0.146) (0.075) (0.150) (0.163)
Note: Each variable is averaged over non-missing values. Standard errors are clustered on the city level and
reported in parentheses.
Figure A1: Frequency distribution of the minimum distance by car to Donetsk or Luhansk
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Table A4: Distance by car (km) from Donbass cities to Donetsk and Luhansk
Donetsk Luhansk
Artemivsk 85.2 113.0
Bilovodsk 244.0 89.3
Kostiantynivka 67.5 139.0
Kramatorsk 98.9 164.0
Krasnoarmiysk 66.2 189.0
Krasnyy Lyman 140.0 142.0
Mariupol 113.0 273.0
Svatove 199.0 155.0
Source: www.maps.google.com.
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Figure A2: Frequency distribution of attitudes towards Ukraine and Russia in the high treatment
group in 2013-2015
Note: High treatment group includes obsevations up to 100 km by car to Donetsk or Luhansk.
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Table A5: Estimates for Russian speakers only with a distance threshold of 100 km
No controls OLS Propensity score weighting
<100 km ≥100 km DiD <100 km ≥100 km DiD <100 km ≥100 km DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Independent, neutral state 0.006 0.088 -0.082 0.190 0.078 0.112 0.181 0.248 -0.067
se 0.314 0.087 0.327 0.275 0.071 0.280 0.269 0.299 0.360
p-value 0.985 0.308 0.801 0.489 0.269 0.690 0.501 0.407 0.853
observations 46 479 525 41 447 488 41 447 488
Union with Russia -0.396 -0.263 -0.134 -0.591 -0.242 -0.349 -0.605 -0.361 -0.244
se 0.165 0.067 0.180 0.272 0.054 0.279 0.144 0.293 0.334
p-value 0.016 0.000 0.457 0.030 0.000 0.210 0.000 0.217 0.464
observations 46 479 525 41 447 488 41 447 488
Split into separate states 0.333 0.097 0.236 0.266 0.071 0.195 0.333 0.085 0.248
se 0.190 0.050 0.196 0.353 0.030 0.354 0.190 0.102 0.198
p-value 0.079 0.053 0.228 0.451 0.017 0.582 0.080 0.407 0.209
observations 46 479 525 41 447 488 41 447 488
Fully the same cultures -1.838 -0.111 -1.727 -2.038 -0.042 -1.997 -1.947 0.618 -2.564
se 0.734 0.293 0.786 0.836 0.275 0.875 0.807 0.990 1.311
p-value 0.012 0.706 0.028 0.015 0.879 0.023 0.016 0.533 0.050
observations 57 578 635 51 531 582 51 531 582
One state with Russia -3.816 -0.833 -2.983 -4.300 -0.635 -3.665 -4.374 -0.744 -3.630
se 1.290 0.366 1.341 5.446 0.352 5.466 1.554 1.726 2.567
p-value 0.003 0.023 0.026 0.430 0.071 0.503 0.005 0.666 0.157
observations 50 514 564 44 472 516 44 472 516
I love Ukraine -0.747 -0.036 -0.710 -0.457 0.008 -0.465 -0.485 -0.003 -0.482
se 0.650 0.109 0.654 1.235 0.091 1.237 0.679 0.319 0.759
p-value 0.251 0.739 0.277 0.711 0.931 0.707 0.476 0.993 0.525
observations 61 607 668 55 556 611 55 556 611
“We” for Ukrainians -0.107 -0.058 -0.048 0.136 -0.005 0.141 0.148 -0.154 0.302
se 0.510 0.146 0.529 0.781 0.120 0.787 0.384 0.404 0.515
p-value 0.835 0.691 0.927 0.862 0.966 0.858 0.700 0.703 0.558
observations 61 607 668 55 556 611 55 556 611
Note: Observations < 100 km to Donetsk or Luhansk form the high treatment group, while those ≥ 100 km
form the low treatment group. Propensity scores are estimated by logistic regression. Standard errors are
clustered on the city level using 999 bootstrap replications.
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Table A6: Estimates for age below 45 only with a distance threshold of 100 km
No controls OLS Propensity score weighting
<100 km ≥100 km DiD <100 km ≥100 km DiD <100 km ≥100 km DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Independent, neutral state 0.401 0.009 0.392 0.467 -0.020 0.488 0.374 0.216 0.158
se 0.209 0.060 0.216 0.237 0.059 0.245 0.328 0.169 0.411
p-value 0.055 0.883 0.069 0.048 0.728 0.047 0.254 0.202 0.700
observations 73 759 832 66 714 780 66 714 780
Union with Russia -0.398 -0.221 -0.178 -0.560 -0.224 -0.337 -0.508 -0.228 -0.281
se 0.105 0.053 0.116 0.282 0.048 0.286 0.228 0.195 0.263
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.047 0.000 0.239 0.026 0.243 0.285
observations 73 759 832 66 714 780 66 714 780
Split into separate states 0.177 0.050 0.126 0.266 0.034 0.233 0.208 0.035 0.173
se 0.096 0.021 0.098 0.246 0.017 0.246 0.105 0.041 0.100
p-value 0.065 0.017 0.196 0.278 0.044 0.344 0.046 0.391 0.083
observations 73 759 832 66 714 780 66 714 780
Fully the same cultures -1.727 -0.008 -1.719 -1.602 -0.050 -1.551 -2.026 0.616 -2.642
se 0.709 0.323 0.789 0.694 0.364 0.774 0.955 0.766 1.265
p-value 0.015 0.981 0.029 0.021 0.890 0.045 0.034 0.421 0.037
observations 84 881 965 76 817 893 76 817 893
One state with Russia -2.929 -1.154 -1.775 -3.403 -1.149 -2.254 -3.449 -0.787 -2.662
se 0.903 0.259 0.928 1.531 0.304 1.572 0.842 0.898 1.302
p-value 0.001 0.000 0.056 0.026 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.381 0.041
observations 82 820 902 73 761 834 73 761 834
Love to Ukraine 0.018 0.225 -0.207 0.140 0.244 -0.104 0.171 0.230 -0.058
se 0.326 0.078 0.331 0.889 0.080 0.895 0.401 0.334 0.511
p-value 0.957 0.004 0.532 0.875 0.002 0.908 0.669 0.492 0.909
observations 93 919 1012 83 847 930 83 847 930
“We” for Ukrainians 0.382 0.157 0.226 0.603 0.151 0.452 0.731 -0.033 0.765
se 0.246 0.113 0.270 0.671 0.127 0.674 0.317 0.313 0.401
p-value 0.121 0.167 0.403 0.369 0.234 0.502 0.021 0.915 0.056
observations 93 919 1012 83 847 930 83 847 930
Note: Median age in the evaluation sample is 45. Observations up to 100 km to Donetsk or Luhansk form
the high treatment group, while those from 100 km define the low treatment group. Propensity score
is estimated with logistic regression. Standard errors are clustered on the city level using 999 bootstrap
replications.
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Table A7: Effects on item non-response in outcome variables for distance threshold of 100 km
No controls OLS Propensity score weighting
<100 km ≥100 km DiD <100 km ≥100 km DiD <100 km ≥100 km DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Independent, neutral state 0.119 -0.030 0.149 0.148 -0.048 0.196 0.177 -0.092 0.269
se 0.184 0.035 0.189 0.250 0.042 0.253 0.310 0.065 0.316
p-value 0.520 0.395 0.430 0.553 0.250 0.439 0.567 0.154 0.394
observations 187 1886 2073 166 1768 1934 166 1768 1934
Union with Russia 0.119 -0.030 0.149 0.148 -0.048 0.196 0.177 -0.092 0.269
se 0.193 0.035 0.197 0.255 0.044 0.260 0.333 0.068 0.338
p-value 0.540 0.394 0.451 0.562 0.271 0.452 0.594 0.179 0.425
observations 187 1886 2073 166 1768 1934 166 1768 1934
Split into separate states 0.119 -0.030 0.149 0.148 -0.048 0.196 0.177 -0.092 0.269
se 0.195 0.037 0.198 0.270 0.042 0.273 0.335 0.065 0.343
p-value 0.543 0.409 0.452 0.584 0.248 0.474 0.596 0.158 0.433
observations 187 1886 2073 166 1768 1934 166 1768 1934
Fully the same cultures -0.037 -0.015 -0.022 -0.025 -0.018 -0.008 0.004 -0.037 0.040
se 0.015 0.010 0.018 0.021 0.011 0.024 0.026 0.032 0.042
p-value 0.015 0.142 0.228 0.229 0.124 0.748 0.892 0.248 0.332
observations 187 1886 2073 166 1768 1934 166 1768 1934
One state with Russia 0.029 0.022 0.007 0.080 0.005 0.076 0.082 0.004 0.078
se 0.064 0.019 0.066 0.069 0.020 0.072 0.063 0.061 0.085
p-value 0.646 0.249 0.911 0.246 0.809 0.292 0.192 0.947 0.360
observations 187 1886 2073 166 1768 1934 166 1768 1934
Note: Dummies for missing observations in outcomes are treated as outcome variables. There are no missing
observations for variables “I love Ukraine” and ““we” for Ukrainians”. Observations up to 100 km to
Donetsk or Luhansk form the high treatment group, while those from 100 km define the low treatment
group. Propensity score is estimated with logistic regression. Standard errors are clustered on the city
level using 999 bootstrap replications.
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Table A8: Placebo DiD estimates for a distance threshold of 100 km to Okhtyrka
No controls OLS Propensity score weighting
(1) (2) (3)
Independent, neutral state 0.034 0.064 0.083
se 0.094 0.175 0.165
p-value 0.714 0.713 0.616
observations 621 593 593
Union with Russia 0.187 0.193 0.173
se 0.088 0.381 0.271
p-value 0.034 0.613 0.524
observations 621 593 593
Split into separate states -0.053 -0.063 -0.069
se 0.038 0.048 0.153
p-value 0.160 0.192 0.652
observations 621 593 593
Fully the same cultures -0.013 -0.229 0.105
se 1.626 1.626 2.287
p-value 0.994 0.888 0.963
observations 708 675 675
One state with Russia 0.311 0.311 0.801
se 0.669 0.672 1.467
p-value 0.642 0.644 0.585
observations 681 650 650
I love Ukraine 0.135 0.054 -0.032
se 0.264 0.492 0.479
p-value 0.608 0.912 0.946
observations 756 718 718
“We” for Ukrainians 0.074 0.032 0.009
se 0.195 0.886 0.237
p-value 0.702 0.971 0.969
observations 756 718 718
Note: Observations < 100 km to Okhtyrka form the high treatment
placebo group, while those ≥ 100 km form the low treatment
placebo group. Propensity scores are estimated by logistic re-
gression. Standard errors are clustered on the city level using 999
bootstrap replications.
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Table A9: Placebo DiD estimates for a distance threshold of 100 km to Zhytomyr
No controls OLS Propensity score weighting
(1) (2) (3)
Independent, neutral state 0.213 0.182 0.136
se 0.189 0.223 0.292
p-value 0.260 0.416 0.641
observations 646 627 627
Union with Russia -0.135 -0.115 -0.021
se 0.070 0.094 0.099
p-value 0.053 0.221 0.836
observations 646 627 627
Split into separate states 0.027 0.025 0.017
se 0.017 0.017 0.015
p-value 0.115 0.142 0.264
observations 646 627 627
Fully the same cultures 0.403 0.341 0.409
se 0.857 0.857 1.346
p-value 0.638 0.691 0.761
observations 710 688 688
One state with Russia 0.173 0.277 0.611
se 0.478 0.454 0.747
p-value 0.718 0.542 0.413
observations 711 691 691
I love Ukraine 0.141 0.073 -0.044
se 0.252 0.208 0.397
p-value 0.576 0.727 0.912
observations 739 716 716
“We” for Ukrainians -0.048 -0.223 -0.142
se 0.401 0.500 0.530
p-value 0.904 0.655 0.789
observations 739 716 716
Note: Observations < 100 km to Zhytomyr form the high treat-
ment placebo group, while those ≥ 100 km form the low treat-
ment placebo group. Propensity scores are estimated by logistic
regression. Standard errors are clustered on the city level using
999 bootstrap replications.
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This study empirically evaluates the impact of the war in eastern Ukraine on the political attitudes 
and sentiments towards Ukraine and Russia among the population living close to the war zone 
on the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government. Exploiting unique survey data that 
were collected in early 2013 (13 months before the outbreak of the conflict) and early 2015 
(11 months after the outbreak), we employ two strategies to infer how the war has affected two 
different groups defined by distance to the war zone. First, we apply a before-after analysis to 
examine intra-group changes in attitudes over time. Second, we use a difference-in-differences 
approach to investigate inter-group divergence over time. Under particular assumptions, the 
latter approach yields a lower absolute bound for the effect. We control for a range of observed 
characteristics and consider both parametric and semiparametric estimation based on inverse 
probability weighting. Our results suggest that one year of conflict negatively affected attitudes 
towards Russia, while mostly no statistically significant intra- or inter-group differences were 
found for sentiments towards Ukraine.
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